423 the land was hereditary property, which had the positive results of continual and steady use of the land and the negative one of constant subdivision of the peasant holdings in the country. The Bolshevik uprising did not bring about any significant improvements in the life of the small holders as sovkhozes and kolkhozes were organized on the large estates. Up until 1930, D. Prishchepov, a former Socialist-Revolutionary, was the head of the National Commissariat of Agriculture. He had managed to live abroad and become acquainted with agricultural conditions in Denmark and Germany. Upon his return to Belorussia he contemplated a series of measures which he considered the more useful since they were in accordance with the desires of the great mass of the Belorussian peasantry. So as to increase the land fund and distribute it among those who had little or none, Prishchepov managed to abolish a part, although an insignificant one, of the Soviet farms and also to bring about significant reductions in the land belonging to these establishments. As the basic unit of land to be used, Prishchepov chose the small village of ten to twenty peasant farms, with comfortable farmsteads of up to one hectare in size. /11/
[311] Even in those times it cost him* a great effort to prove the advantage of the small village over the large one as a method of land exploitation. The necessity of rapid reconstruction of the system of land tenure in Belorussia was obvious. In the first place there was the question of what to do with the reserve land which had been given for temporary use to the landless peasants and those with small holdings. Then, it was proposed to apportion crowded and disorganized large villages among small ones. Part of the peasantry wanted small separate farms under the new system, but Prishchepov could not officially establish separate farmsteads. In practice it happened as an exception that, when lands were being distributed in the woods, separate farms were
668 cut out as well as small villages. . . To placate the theoreticians, Prishchepov* had to assure them that it was very easy to make the transformation from a small village to an agricultural commune. Prishchepov knew quite well how absurd these assurances were, but being one of the leaders of the national movement he was guided by the interests of the country and not by the presuppositions of the
654 Communists which at the time were both unclear and confused. In addition to increasing agricultural assistance Prishchepov* introduced a series of measures designed to encourage improvements on the holdings of independent peasants. Various types of agricultural exibition

*[D. Prishchepov, head of the National Commissariat of Agriculture, beginning about 1920 to 1930 - Analyst]

154 were widely promoted by Narkomzem where diplomas and testimonials were presented and prizes of goods and cash awarded. All these measures of D. Prishchepov were subsequently brought against him as accusations, to show that he was against the socialist forms of agriculture and that his work was not only harmful but outright sabotage.

423 The "gathering together" of the Belorussian lands and their unification with the B. S. S. R. was completed only in the beginning of 1927 ... The question of consolidating within the B. S. S. R. regions which were tied to it economically as well as having a homogeneous population had been raised several times before the Kremlin ... The problem was not solved until 1924 partly by the annexation of a
000 section of the Vitebsk and Mogilev provinces. On the occasion of the annexation of these regions an extraordinary session of the Central Executive Committee of the B. S. S. R. was convoked, with workers and peasants also participating. The President of the Central Executive Committee of the R. S. F. S. R., M. Kalinin, was present at the session, together with two well-known Comintern figures -- the Poles Felix Kohn and Tomasz Dombalj. During his own speech Dombalj turned to the loge of the Polish counsul and cried out in a burst of revolutionary enthusiasm, "Remember that only we have the right to speak in the name of Poles and peasants!" Dombalj was a deputy to the Polish Sejm and for belonging to the Communist Party had been tried and exchanged for someone in the Soviet Union. The future Soviet Marshall, Tukhachevskii, was also present at the session, and his restrained and correct deportment contrasted with that of the Caucasian, Gai, the commander of the Cavalry Corps, /12/ who paced up and down nervously during his speech and shouted, "We will water our horses in the Vistula yet!" The session was officially designated as a triumphant celebration of the correctness of Soviet policy toward the nationalities. M. Kalinin, by attending, emphasized the "voluntary accession" of the territory of the B. S. S. R.; the Polish Communists who were present demonstrated their solidarity with the Soviets in questions of policy toward minorities, in opposition to the policy of Poland which had taken over western Belorussia while General Zhilunovich forcibly occupied Wilno. The speeches of Tukhachevskii, the deputy director of the Red Army General Staff, and Gai, who had taken part in the raid, on Warsaw, even though it was unsuccessful, bore witness to the unsatisfied pretensions to Poland which were backed up with armed might.